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Abstract 
 The objective of this study is to analyze volatility transmission between the US and 
Eurozone stock markets considering the financial market responses to the September 11, March 
11 and July 7 terrorist attacks. In order to do this, we use a multivariate GARCH model and take 
into account the asymmetric volatility phenomenon, the non-synchronous trading problem and 
the turmoil periods themselves. Moreover, a graphical analysis of the Asymmetric Volatility 
Impulse-Response Functions (AVIRF) is introduced, which takes into consideration the financial 
market responses to the terrorist attacks. Results suggest that there is bidirectional and 
asymmetric volatility transmission and show the different impact that terrorist attacks had on 
both markets. 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: C32; F30; G15 
Keywords: international financial markets; stock market crisis; multivariate GARCH; volatility 
spillovers 
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1   Introduction 
On September 11, 2001; March 11, 2004; and July 7, 2005, the cities of New York, Madrid 
and London experienced respectively devastating terrorist attacks. These attacks had an influence 
over several economic variables and they obviously affected financial markets. Taking into 
account increasing global financial integration, an important question arises: How did these 
terrorist attacks affect interrelations between financial markets? 
The main objective of this study is to analyze how volatility transmission patterns are 
affected by stock market crises. Moreover, we compare the different reactions of the markets to 
the terrorist attacks considered. To do this, we use a multivariate GARCH model and take into 
account both the asymmetric volatility phenomenon and the non-synchronous trading problem. 
In our empirical application, we focus on stock market crises as a result of terrorist attacks and 
analyze international volatility transmission b tween the US and Eurozone financial markets. 
Pericoli and Sbracia (2003)’s survey on financial contagion compiles the five most common 
definitions for financial crisis contagion.1 Our work casts with the second definition given by 
Pericoli and Sbracia (2003, page 574): “Contagion occurs when volatility of asset prices spills 
over from the crisis country to other countries”. The empirical specification used for testing 
financial crisis contagion can be seen as a special case of the general framework proposed in 
Dungey et al. (2005), where contagion is represented by a significant response to 
contemporaneous shocks coming from another market after conditioning on the interdependence 
between markets in a non-crisis environment. 
                                                 
1 See also Allen and Gale (2000) for theoretical models on financial contagion. 
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 2 
It must be highlighted that most existing studies on spillovers between developed countries 
focus on individual countries such as US, Canada, Japan, UK, France, and Germany.2 As far as 
we know, there are no articles analyzing volatility transmission patterns between the US and the 
Eurozone as a global market. Moreover, this paper will be the first to take into account the non-
synchronous trading problem and to use a sample period that includes the September 11, March 
11 and July 7 terrorist attacks. 
As far as we know, no paper has analyzed until now the effects of the attacks of March 11 
and July 7. Moreover, few studies have examined the effects of the attacks of September 11 on 
financial markets and they focus on the economy as a whole or in different specific aspects of the 
economy.3 For instance, Poteshman (2006) analyzes whether there was unusual option market 
activity prior to the terrorist attacks. Ito and Lee (2005) and Blunk et al. (2006) assess the impact 
of the September 11 attack on US airline demand. Glaser and Weber (2006) focus on how the 
terrorist attack influenced expected returns and volatility forecasts of individual investors. Chen 
and Siems (2004) investigate if terrorist and military attacks (including the September 11 attack) 
are associated with significant negative abnormal returns in global capital markets. Finally, 
Choudhry (2005) investigates the effects of the September 11 attack and the period afterwards on 
the time-varying beta of a few companies in the US.  However, none analyze volatility 
transmission patterns and how they have been affected by the event. As far as we know, the only 
papers that analyze changes in interrelations between stock markets are Hon et al. (2004) and 
Mun (2005), but they test whether the terrorist attack resulted in a change in correlation across 
                                                 
2 See Koutmous and Booth (1995), Karolyi (1995), Karolyi and Stulz (1996), Darbar and Deb (1997), Ramchand 
and Susmel (1998), Brooks and Henry (2000), Longin and Solnik (2001), Martens and Poon (2001) and Bera and 
Kim (2002), inter alia. 
3 A special issue of the Economic Policy Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2002, Volume 8, 
Number 2) analyzes general economic consequences of September 11. A special issue of the Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty (2003, Volume 26, Numbers 2/3) deals with the risks of terrorism with a special focus on September 11. 
A special issue of the European Journal of Political Economy (2004, Volume 20, Issue 2) deals with the economic 
consequences of terror. 
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 3 
global financial markets. We try to answer the following question: Were there differences in the 
reaction of the US and Eurozone stock markets to the different terrorist attacks considered? To 
do so, we propose a new version of the Asymmetric Volatility Impulse Response Functions 
(AVIRF) which takes into account stock market crises. In particular, we expect to find 
differences in stock market reactions to the three terrorist attacks. These differences might be due 
to: i) the impact those attacks had on particular industries/sectors, ii) whether the attack was 
considered as a local, regional, or global shock, and iii) the state of the economy at the time the 
event took place.4  
When studying asset price comovements and contagion between different financial markets, 
an important fact to take into account are the trading hours in each market. In the case of 
partially overlapping markets (such as the US and Eurozone), a jump in prices can be observed 
in the first market to open when the second market starts trading, reflecting information 
contained in the opening price. Therefore, this could increase volatility in this first market. 
Moreover, as suggested by Hamao et al. (1990), a correlation analysis between partially 
overlapping markets using close to close returns could produce false spillovers, both in mean and 
volatility. This is because it is difficult to separate effects coming from the foreign market from 
those coming from the domestic market while it remains closed.  
There are several solutions for artificially synchronizing international markets. First of all, 
in the case of US, information transmission with other markets can be analyzed through 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), which share trading hours with the US market. The 
problem is that there are few ADRs, they are not actively traded, and there are microstructure 
differences between the North American stock market and the original country market [see 
                                                 
4 The use of local, regional and global shock is similar to the taxonomy for crisis transmission proposed in Dungey 
and Martin (2007). These authors propose a model which captures a range of common factors including global 
shocks, country and market shocks, and idiosyncratic shocks. 
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Wongswan (2006)]. Some studies, such as Longin and Solnik (1995) and Ramchand and Susmel 
(1998), use weekly or monthly data to avoid the non-synchronous trading problem. However, the 
use of low frequency data leads to small samples, which is inefficient for multivariate modeling. 
Some studies, such as Hamao et al. (1990) and Koutmos and Booth (1995), use daily non-
synchronous open-to-close and close-to-open returns. Nevertheless, these studies cannot 
distinguish volatility spillovers from contemporaneous correlations. Finally, Martens and Poon 
(2001) use 16:00-to-16:00 synchronous stock market series to solve this problem. By doing this, 
they find a bidirectional spillover between US and France and between US and UK, contrary to 
previous studies that only found volatility spillovers from the US to the other countries. 
Similarly, Kleimeier et al. (2008) uses synchronous data (they refer to it as time-aligned data) to 
analyse the financial turmoil surrounding the Asian crisis. 
This study innovates with respect the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, we study 
volatility transmission between the US and the Eurozone using a sample period that includes the 
terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and London. Secondly, we introduce a new version of 
Asymmetric Volatility Impulse Response Functions which takes into account stock market 
crises. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and offers some 
preliminary analysis. Section 3 deals with the econometric approach and introduces the AVIRF 
with crises. Section 4 presents the empirical results and, finally, Section 5 summarizes the main 
results. 
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2  Data 
The data consists of simultaneous daily stock market prices recorded at 15:00 GMT for the 
US (S&P500 index) and the Eurozone (EuroStoxx50 index).5 At that time, the European markets 
are about to close and the US market has just started trading. We use stock market prices 
recorded at 15:00 GMT, at the midpoint of the overlapping hours, to avoid using index prices 
recorded exactly at the open (US) and close (Eurozone) of trading.  
The data is extracted from Visual Chart Group (www.visualchart.com) for the period 
January 18, 2000 to January 25, 2006. When there is no common trading day, because of a 
holiday in one of the markets, the index values recorded on the previous day are used.6 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
t
R ,1  p-value tR ,2  
p-value 
Mean -0.00009  -0.00019  
Variance 0.00013  0.00021  
Skewness 0.11202 [0.0701] 0.00400 [0.9484] 
Kurtosis 3.72923 [0.0000] 4.90041 [0.0000] 
Bera-Jarque 782.423 [0.0000] 910.341 [0.0000] 
Q(12) 23.2728 [0.0255] 28.8222 [0.0041] 
Q²(12) 502.408 [0.0000] 842.236 [0.0000] 
ARCH(12) 185.035 [0.0000] 255.721 [0.0000] 
ADF(4) -1.87522 [0.3443] -1.52663 [0.5200] 
PP(7) -1.90664 [0.3295] -1.53550 [0.5154] 
 
Note: p-values displayed as [.]. R1,t  and R2,t represent the log-returns of the S&P500 and the EuroStoxx50 indexes. 
The Bera-Jarque statistic tests for the normal distribution hypothesis and has an asymptotic distribution X2(2). Q(12) 
and Q²(12) are Ljung-Box tests for twelfth order serial correlation in the returns and squared returns. ARCH(12) is 
Engle’s test for twelfth order ARCH, distributed as X2(12). The ADF (number of lags) and PP (truncation lag) refer 
to the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1981) and Phillips and Perron (1988) unit root tests. Critical value at 5% 
significance level of MacKinnon (1991) for the ADF and PP tests (process with intercept but without trend) is -2.86. 
 
                                                 
5 The Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 Index, Europe's leading blue-chip index for the Eurozone (that is, the European 
Monetary Union), provides a blue-chip representation of supersector leaders in the Eurozone. The index covers 50 
stocks from 12 Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
6 As the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was closed during September 11 and the three following days, the 
S&P500 index value recorded the previous day is used for those dates. 
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Table 1 presents some summary statistics on the daily returns, which are defined as log 
differences in index values. The Jarque-Bera test rejects normality of the returns for both 
indexes. This is caused mainly by excess kurtosis, suggesting that any model for equity returns 
should accommodate this characteristic of equity returns. The ARCH test reveals that the returns 
exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity, while the Ljung-Box test (of twelfth order) indicates 
significant autocorrelation in both markets in squared returns but not in levels. Fat tails and non-
normal distributions are common features of financial data. Finally, both the augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) and Philips and Perron (PP) tests indicate that both series have a single unit root. 
Table 2 shows that both series (in log levels) are not cointegrated, the optimal lag length 
following the AIC criterion being four.7  
 
Table 2. Johansen (1988) tests for cointegration 
 
Lags Null )(rtraceλ  Critical Value )(max rλ  Critical Value 
4 R = 0 11.81020  20.26184 7.685361 15.89210 
 R = 1 4.124843 9.164546 4.124843 9.164546 
 
Note: The lag length is determined using the AIC criterion. λtrace (r) tests the null hypothesis that there are at most r 
cointegration relationships against the alternative that the number of cointegration vectors is greater than r. λmax (r) 
tests the null hypothesis that there are r cointegration relationships against the alternative that the number of 
cointegration vectors is greater than r + 1. Critical values at the 0.05 level are from MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis 
(1999).  
 
 
 
 
Each terrorist attack had a different effect on financial markets. If we focus on the 
September 11 attack, both price indexes reached their minimum level on September 21. In the 
Eurozone, the EuroStoxx50 fell by 6.7% on the day of the attack; and between September 11 and 
September 21 was down 17.9%. The New York Stock Exchange did not open until September 17 
                                                 
7 Cointegration between both indexes was also rejected at the usual significance levels when using closing values of 
both indexes instead of prices recorded at 15:00 GMT. 
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and fell by 5.1%. Between that day and September 21, the S&P 500 fell by 12.3%. In contrast 
with the effects of the September 11, the March 11 terrorist attack affected both markets less. 
The EuroStoxx50 decreased by 3.1% on the day of the attack and, at the end of that month, it had 
returned to the pre-attack levels. In the same way, the S&P 500 suffered a small decline (1.5%) 
and recovered in less than a month. Finally, the July 7 attack had no effect on the S&P 500 and 
its impact on the EuroStoxx50 was small (1.7%). All in all, the three terrorist attacks affected the 
Eurozone more than the US market. 
Table 3 evaluates the US$ value impact of the terrorist attack in the analysed markets. It 
shows that the $/€ exchange rate was not appreciably affected by the terrorist attacks and, 
consequently, stock index market returns would not significantly change for US$ valued 
portfolios representing stock market indices.8 
 
 
Table 3. Exchange rate and stock index returns in the crisis periods 
 
Crisis Period Exchange Rate ($/€) EuroStoxx 50 S&P 500 
Sep 11 – Sep 21, 2001 1.6% -17.9% -12.3% 
Mar 11 – Mar 22,  2004 -2.6% -7.4% -2.5% 
July 7, 2005 0.1% -1.7% 0.2% 
 
Note: This table sums up the returns of the $/€ exchange rate and the stock indices (Euro Stoxx 50 and S&P 500) for 
each terrorist attack. 
 
 
 
3   The Econometric Approach 
3.1 The model 
                                                 
8 The authors thank one of the referees for this comment. 
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 8 
The econometric model is estimated in a three-step procedure. First, a VAR model is 
estimated to clean up any autocorrelation behaviour. Then, the residuals of the model are 
orthogonalized. These orthogonalized innovations have the useful property that they are 
uncorrelated across both time and markets. Finally, the orthogonalized innovations will be used 
as an input to estimate a multivariate asymmetric GARCH model. 
To take into account the September 11, March 11 and July 7 terrorist attacks, three dummy 
series are introduced in the conditional mean equations. These dummies equal one the days 
following the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and London respectively until the days 
when the indexes take their lowest values, and 0 otherwise.  
Equation (1) models the mean equation as a VAR(5) process: 
 
)1(71111
71111
,2
5
1
,2,22
5
1
,1,212222,2
,1
5
1
,2,12
5
1
,1,111111,1
t
p
ptp
p
ptptttt
t
p
ptp
p
ptptttt
uRdRdJzMySxR
uRdRdJzMySxR
∑∑
∑∑
=
−
=
−
=
−
=
−
++++++=
++++++=
µ
µ
 
 
where R1,t and R2,t are US and Eurozone returns, respectively, iiii zyx ,,,µ  and dij,p  for i,j=1,2 
and p=1,…,5 are the parameters to be estimated and S11t, M11t and J7t are dummy series for the 
terrorist attacks. Finally, 
tu ,1  and tu ,2  are the non-orthogonal innovations. The VAR lag has been 
chosen following the AIC criterion.  
 The innovations tu ,1  and tu ,2  are non-orthogonal because, in general, the covariance 
matrix ( )∑= 'ttuuE  is not diagonal. Following Baele (2005), because the estimated US and 
Eurozone shocks from the first step could be driven by common news, the non-orthogonal 
Page 10 of 34
E-mail: quant@tandf.co.uk  URL://http.manuscriptcentral.com/tandf/rquf
Quantitative Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 9 
innovations ( tu ,1  and tu ,2 ) are orthogonalized ( t,1ε  and t,2ε ) in a second step. If we choose any 
matrix M so that ∑ =−− IMM 1'1 , then the new innovations:  
)2(1−= Muttε                                               
satisfy ( ) IE tt ='εε . Such a matrix M can be any solution of  ∑= .'MM   
To model the conditional variance-covariance matrix we use an asymmetric version of the 
BEKK model [Baba et al. (1989), Engle and Kroner (1995) and Kroner and Ng (1998)]. As in 
the mean equations, we introduce dummy series to take into account the terrorist attacks.  
The compacted form of this model is: 
 
)3(''''''' ' 11
'
11
'
11
'
11
'
111 LLMMSSGGAABHBCCH tttttttttttt −−−−−−−−−−− ++++++= ϑϑξξδδηηεε
 
 
where C, B, A, G, S, M and L are matrices of parameters to be estimated, being C upper-
triangular and positive definite, and Ht the conditional variance-covariance matrix in t. 
In the bivariate case, the BEKK model is written as follows: 
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where  jijijijijiji msgabc ,,,,,, ,,,,, and jil ,  for all i,j=1,2 are parameters, t,1ε  and t.2ε  are the 
orthogonalized innovation series coming from equation (2), tt ,1,1 ,0[max εη −= ] and 
tt ,2,2 ,0[max εη −= ] are the Glosten et al. (1993) dummy series collecting a negative asymmetry 
from the shocks and, finally, hij,t for all i,j=1, are the conditional second moment series. 
Similarly to ti,η , the variables titi ,, , ξδ and ti,ϑ  for all i=1,2 are the dummy series for the terrorist 
attacks. They take the values of the shocks in the days following the terrorist attacks in New 
York, Madrid, and London respectively, until the days where the indexes reach their lowest 
values and 0 otherwise. 
The study of any financial crisis contagion requires first an unambiguous identification of 
financial crisis. Following Pericoli and Sbracia (2003, page 573), the literature has related a 
stock market crisis with a sharp fall in the stock market index or with an upsurge in its volatility. 
Consequently, the most used standard identification pattern is that periods of crisis coincide with 
periods of extreme values of the variable under consideration (see Pericoli and Sbracia (2003, 
page 579)).  Following this criterion, the presented results correspond to crisis periods defined as 
follows: from September 11 to September 21 for the New York attack, from March 11 to March 
22 for the Madrid attack and July 7 for the London attack. Nevertheless, other possibilities were 
explored. Results, available upon request, show that coefficients in matrices S, M and L are less 
significant as the crisis period increases. Alternatively, Caporale et al. (2005) proposed a 
bootstrapping test to select endogenously the breakpoints corresponding to the beginning of the 
contagion period. The sophisticated method proposed by Caporale et al. (2005) is especially 
suitable for those crises where it is difficult to identify the starting time of crisis contagion but 
this does not apply to terrorist attacks. 
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Equation (4) allows for both own-market and cross-market influences in the conditional 
variance, therefore enabling the analysis of volatility spillovers between both markets. Moreover, 
the BEKK model guarantees by construction that the variance-covariance matrix will be positive 
definite. 
In equation (4), parameters 
jijijijijiji msgabc ,,,,,, ,,,,, and jil , for all i,j=1,2 cannot be 
interpreted individually. Instead, we have to interpret the non-linear functions of the parameters 
which form the intercept terms and the coefficients of the lagged variances, covariances, and 
error terms. We follow Kearney and Patton (2000) and calculate the expected value and the 
standard error of those non-linear functions. The expected value of a non-linear function of 
random variables is calculated as the function of the expected value of the variables, if the 
estimated variables are unbiased. To calculate the standard errors of the function, a first-order 
Taylor approximation is used. This linearizes the function by using the variance-covariance 
matrix of the parameters as well as the mean and standard error vectors. 
The parameters of the bivariate BEKK system are estimated by maximizing the conditional 
log-likelihood function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )∑
=
−+−−=
T
t
tttt HH
TN
L
1
1'ln
2
1
2ln
2
εθεθpiθ  
 
where T is the number of observations, N is the number of variables in the system, and θ  denotes 
the vector of all the parameters to be estimated. Numerical maximization techniques were used 
to maximize this non-linear log likelihood function based on the BFGS algorithm.  
To estimate the model in equations (1) and (3), it is assumed that the vector of innovations 
is conditionally normal and a quasi-maximum likelihood method is applied. Bollerslev and 
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Wooldridge (1992) show that the standard errors calculated using this method are robust even 
when the normality assumption is violated.  
3.2 Asymmetric Volatility Impulse Response Functions (AVIRF) with crisis 
The Volatility Impulse-Response Function (VIRF), proposed by Lin (1997), is a useful 
methodology for obtaining information on the second moment interaction between related 
markets. The VIRF, AVIRF, and our proposed crisis version, measure the impact of an 
unexpected shock on the predicted volatility. This is: 
 
[ ]
)5(
)'(
|
3,
tt
tst
s
dg
HvechE
R
εε
ψ
∂
∂
=
+  
 
where 3,sR  is a 3x2 matrix, ,...2,1=s  is the lead indicator for the conditioning expectation 
operator, tH  is the 2x2 conditional covariance matrix, )',()'( ,2
2
,1
2
ttttdg εεεε =∂ , tψ  is the set of 
conditioning information. The vech operator transforms a symmetric NxN matrix into a vector by 
stacking each column of the matrix underneath the other, and considering only diagonal and 
lower diagonal elements of the matrix. 
 In volatility symmetric structures, it is not necessary to disti guish between positive and 
negative shocks, but with asymmetric structures the VIRF can change with the sign of the shock. 
The asymmetric VIRF (AVIRF) for the asymmetric BEKK model is introduced in Meneu and 
Torró (2003). Similarly, it would be interesting to distinguish between periods of relative 
stability and periods of financial distress. Therefore, in this article we introduce a version of the 
AVIRF which takes into account periods of stock market crisis. By applying (5) to (3), we 
obtain: 
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where )( 3,3,
−+
ss RR  represents the VIRF for positive (negative) initial shocks in periods of 
stability, )( ,3,
,
3,
c
s
c
s RR
−+  represents the VIRF for positive (negative) initial shocks in periods of stock 
market crisis, a, b and g are 3x3 parameter matrices, α  is the probability of occurrence of a 
crisis and w is a 3x3 parameter matrix that, in our case, equals s, m and l during the September 
11, March 11 and July 7 terrorist attacks, respectively.9 Moreover, NN DAADa )''( ⊗=
+ , 
NN DBBDb )''( ⊗=
+ , 
NN DGGDg )''( ⊗=
+  and 
NN DWWDw )''( ⊗=
+ , where DN is a duplication 
matrix, +ND  is its Moore-Penrose inverse and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product between 
matrices, that is: 












=
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
ND                                   












=
+
1
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
ND  
                                                 
9 The specification in equations (6) to (9) for testing crises contagion can be seen as a particular case of the general 
framework proposed in Dungey et al. (2005). In our model, the "contagious transmission channel" (in words of 
Dungey et al. (2005)) is measured through the significance of w in the market receiving the crisis contagion.  
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It is important to note that this impulse response function examines how fast asset prices 
can incorporate new information. This fact lets us test for the speed of adjustment, analyze the 
dependence of volatilities across the returns of the S&P500 and the EuroStoxx50, distinguish 
between negative and positive shocks and distinguish between crisis periods and non-crisis 
periods. 
4   Empirical Results 
4.1 Model estimation 
Table 4 displays the estimated BEKK model of equation (3). To prevent this paper from 
becoming too long, the results of the estimated VAR(5) are not included, although they are 
available upon request. The low p-values obtained for most of the parameters show that the 
model fits the data well. Table 5 shows the standardized residuals analysis. It can be observed 
that the standardized residuals appear free from serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
As mentioned above, the parameters of Table 4 cannot be interpreted individually. Instead, 
we have to focus on the non-linear functions that form the intercept terms and the coefficients of 
the lagged variance, covariance, and error terms. Table 6 displays the expected value and the 
standard errors of these non-linear functions. 
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Table 4. Estimation results 
Multivariate GARCH model estimation 








=
(0.00)
(0.70)(0.00)
0.000511-
0.0000170.001006-
C  








=
(0.00)(0.00)
(0.07)(0.00)
0.9678560.008417-
0.0015250.950495
B  








=
)00.0()00.0(
)00.0()00.0(
0.098272-0.202174
0.1185280.046510-
A  








=
(0.00)(0.00)
(0.00)(0.00)
0.2028360.105456
0.0344400.295050
G  








=
)00.0()00.0(
)87.0()00.0(
0.152630-0.192744-
0.018969-0.114195
S  








=
(0.69)(0.23)
(0.00)(0.43)
0.0437390.105324-
0.3209450.042863
M  








=
)00.0()92.0(
)00.0()29.0(
6.347604-0.091490
1.3070970.199620-
L  
Note: This table shows the estimation of the model defined in equation (3). P-values appear in brackets. The 
necessary conditions for the stationarity of the process are satisfied.  
 
 
 
Table 5. Summary statistics for the standardized residuals of the model 
 
tt h ,11,1 /ε   tt h ,22,2 /ε   
Q(12) 12.41548 [0.41291] 4.36900 [0.97582] 
Q²(12) 11.23055 [0.50927] 13.43020 [0.33856] 
ARCH(12) 5.903165 [0.92088] 7.484829 [0.82398] 
 
Note: Q(12) and Q²(12) are Ljung-Box tests for twelfth order serial correlation in the standardized residuals and 
squared residuals. ARCH(12) is Engle’s test for twelfth order ARCH, distributed as )12(2χ . The p-values of these 
tests are displayed as [.]. 
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Table 6. Results of the linearized multivariate BEKK model 
 
S&P500 conditional variance equation 
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EuroStoxx50 conditional variance equation 
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Table 6. Results of the linearized multivariate BEKK model (continued)  
 
S&P500- EuroStoxx50 conditional covariance equation 
)-0,0982(
5,9132
0,5807-
)0,7929(
1,7489
1,3867
)-1,0240(
0,2548
0,2609-
)-0,3606(
0,0128
0,0046-
)-1,0429(
0,0308
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0,0166
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0,0079
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0,0023-
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0,0022
0,0212
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0,0634
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Note: h11 and h22 denote the conditional variance for the S&P500 and EuroStoxx50 return series, respectively. Below the estimated coefficients are the standard 
errors, with the corresponding t-values given in parentheses. 
 
The expected value is obtained by taking expectations to the non-linear functions, therefore involving the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the parameters. 
To calculate the standard errors, the function must be linearised using first order Taylor series expansion. This is sometimes called the ‘delta method’.   When a 
variable Y is a function of a variable X, i.e., Y =F(X), the delta method enables us to obtain approximate formulation of the variance of Y if: (1) Y is 
differentiable with respect to X and (2) the variance of X is known. Therefore: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )XV
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X
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Y
YYV
2
2
2
2 
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
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
∂
∂
≈∆≈  
 
When a variable Y is a function of variables X and Z in the form of Y = F(X, Z), we can obtain approximate formulation of the variance of Y if: (1) Y is 
differentiable with respect to X and Z and (2) the variance of X and Z and the covariance between X and Z are known. This is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ZXCov
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Once the variances are calculated it is straightforward to calculate the standard errors. 
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The S&P500 volatility is directly affected by its own volatility ( )1,1h  and by the 
EuroStoxx50 volatility ( )2,2h . Our findings suggest that the S&P500 volatility is affected by its 
own shocks ( )21ε  and the EuroStoxx50 shocks ( )22ε . Finally, the coefficient for its own 
asymmetric term ( )21η  and the EuroStoxx50 asymmetric term are significant ( )22η , indicating that 
negative shocks affect market volatility more than positive shocks.  
The behaviour of the EuroStoxx50 volatility does not differ much from that of the 
S&P500. The EuroStoxx50 volatility is affected by its own volatility ( )2,2h , but not by the 
S&P500 volatility.10 Interestingly, the EuroStoxx50 volatility is affected by the S&P500 shocks 
( )21ε  and its own shocks ( )22ε . Finally, the coefficient for its own asymmetric term ( )21η  and the 
EuroStoxx50 asymmetric term are significant ( )22η , indicating that negative shocks affect market 
volatility more than positive shocks. 
The covariance between the S&P500 and the EuroStoxx50 is affected by its own past 
values ( )
2,1
h , the EuroStoxx50 volatility ( )2,2h , the S&P500 shocks ( )21ε  and the EuroStoxx50 
shocks ( )22ε . Moreover, the coefficients 21η  and 22η  are significant, indicating that negative 
shocks affect market covariance more than positive shocks. 
Regarding dummies, from the analysis of the coefficients significance, the most appealing 
results are: (1) the September 11 terrorist attack had an influence over volatility in both the US 
and Eurozone markets, although in the case of the Eurozone, the effect was indirectly transmitted 
through its own shocks. (2) Both the March 11 and July 7 terrorist attacks did not affect the 
S&P500 volatility. (3) The July 7 terrorist attack in London had an effect on volatility in the 
                                                 
10 This could be due to the fact that prices are recorded at 15:00 GMT, when European markets are about to close 
and the US market has just started trading. 
.  
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Eurozone. However, the March 11 terrorist attack only affected volatility in the Eurozone 
indirectly through shocks coming from the S&P500. 
In general, there is bidirectional volatility transmission between the US and the Eurozone 
stock markets. However, the terrorist attack in New York on September 11 affected volatility in 
the Eurozone stock markets, but the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London in March 11 and July 
7 respectively did not affect volatility in the US market. 
4.2 Asymmetric Volatility Impulse Response Functions (AVIRF) with crisis 
Figures 1 to 5 present the AVIRFs with crisis, computed following Lin (1997) and Meneu 
and Torró (2003), as explained in section 3.2. Results add evidence in favour of bidirectional 
volatility transmission between the US and Eurozone stock markets and show the different 
impacts of these terrorist attacks on both markets. These graphical representations also allow us 
to test for the speed of adjustment, analyze the dependence of volatilities across the returns of the 
S&P500 and the EuroStoxx50, distinguish between negative and positive shocks, and distinguish 
between crisis periods and non-crisis periods..11 
Figure 1 represents the AVIRF when unexpected shocks are positive and there is a period 
of financial stability as opposed to stock market crisis periods caused by terrorist attacks. The 
graphical analysis shows that there are bidirectional volatility spillovers between the S&P500 
and the EuroStoxx50 (about 4% and 1.5% of the shock, respectively, Figures 1B and 1C). 
Positive shocks in the EuroStoxx50 have a relatively small effect on its own volatility (Figure 
                                                 
11 The standard deviation of the responses depends on the estimated coefficients and their covariance matrix (see 
equation (8) in Lin (1997)). Exploding confidence bands in Figures 5A and 5C are due to the high values of 
estimated coefficients in matrix L (see Table 4), even though GARCH coefficients satisfy stationarity conditions. 
This instability can be avoided in several ways, for instance, by enlarging the number of days that this dummy takes 
values different from zero. Nevertheless, when this is done, no coefficient in L remains statistically significant. 
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1D), whereas past positive shocks in the S&P500 have no effect on current volatility (Figure 
1A). 
If unexpected shocks are negative and there is a period of financial stability, Figure 2 
shows that there are also bidirectional volatility spillovers between the S&P500 and the 
EuroStoxx50 (Figures 2B and 2C). Negative shocks in the S&P500 have an important effect on 
its own volatility (Figure 2A). Negative shocks in the EuroStoxx50 also have an important effect 
on its own volatility (Figure 2D), though they are less important than in the case of the S&P500. 
It is interesting to note that own positive shocks do not have any effect on S&P500 volatility, 
whereas own negative shocks have a very significant effect. In all cases, there is evidence of 
asymmetry: negative shocks have a greater effect on volatility than positive shocks. The only 
exception is the effect of shocks from the S&P500 on the EuroStoxx50, where both kinds of 
shock have a similar and relatively small impact on volatility. 
One of the most appealing contributions of the new version of the AVIRF introduced in 
this paper is that it enables differentiation between periods of relative financial stability and 
periods of stock market crisis caused, in this case, by terrorist attacks. Figure 3 represents the 
AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks during the crisis period produced by the September 11 
terrorist attack. Similarly, Figures 4 and 5 represent the AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks 
during the March 11 and July 7 crisis periods, respectively. To interpret these graphs, it is 
important to compare the figures with those obtained in Figure 2, AVIRF to negative unexpected 
shocks in a no-crisis period. 
 In general, the most appealing results are: (1) conditional variances are more sensitive to 
negative than positive shocks; (2) the September 11 terrorist attack (Figure 3) had an influence 
over volatility of both the US and Eurozone markets, because all figures increased their initial 
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response to a shock when compared to Figure 2. In the case of the Eurozone, the effect was 
indirectly transmitted through its own shocks (Figure 3D). (3) Both the March 11 and July 7 
terrorist attacks did not affect the S&P500 volatility (Figures 4A, 4B, 5A and 5B are either non-
significative or they do not change when compared to Figure 2). (4) The March 11 and July 7 
terrorist attacks had an effect on volatility in the Eurozone (Figures 4C, 4D, 5C and 5D). 
However, the March 11 terrorist attack (Figure 4) only affected volatility in the Eurozone 
indirectly through shocks coming from the S&P500 (Figure 4C), as Figure 4D does not change 
when compared to Figure 2D. 
Therefore, these results add evidence favouring the hypothesis of bidirectional variance 
causality between the S&P500 and the EuroStoxx50, but also favouring the hypothesis of 
differing reactions to the terrorist attack from each stock market.  
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Figure 1A. A positive shock in the S&P500
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Figure 1B. A positive shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 1C. A positive shock in the S&P500
-0,02
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
0,14
0,16
0,18
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100
days
A
VI
RF
 
Eu
ro
St
o
x
x
50
 
Figure 1D. A positive shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 1. AVIRF to positive unexpected shocks from the VAR-Asymmetric BEKK 
No Crisis Period 
(Dashed lines display the 90% confidence interval) 
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Figure 2A. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 2B. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 2C. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 2D. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 2. AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks from the VAR-Asymmetric BEKK 
No Crisis Period 
(Dashed lines display the 90% confidence interval) 
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Figure 3A. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 3B. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 3C. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 3D. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 3. AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks from the VAR-Asymmetric BEKK 
Crisis Period (September 11) 
(Dashed lines display the 90% confidence interval) 
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Figure 4A. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 4B. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 4C. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 4D. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 4. AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks from the VAR-Asymmetric BEKK 
Crisis Period (March 11) 
(Dashed lines display the 90% confidence interval) 
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Figure 5A. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 5B. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 5D. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 5. AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks from the VAR-Asymmetric BEKK 
Crisis Period (July 7) 
(Dashed lines display the 90% confidence interval) 
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5   Conclusions 
The main objective of this study is to analyze how volatility transmission patterns are 
affected by stock market crises. To do this, we use a multivariate GARCH model and take into 
account both the asymmetric volatility phenomenon, and the non-synchronous trading problem. 
In our empirical application, we focus on stock market crises as a result of terrorist attacks and 
analyze international volatility transmission between the US and Eurozone financial markets. 
In particular, an asymmetric VAR-BEKK model is estimated with daily stock market 
prices recorded at 15:00 GMT for the US (S&P500 index) and Eurozone (EuroStoxx50 index).   
We also introduce a complementary analysis, the Asymmetric Volatility Impulse Response 
Functions (AVIRF) with crisis, which distinguishes both a) effects coming from a positive shock 
from those coming from a negative shock, and b) effects coming from periods of stability from 
those coming from periods of crisis. 
The results confirm that there are asymmetric volatility effects on both markets and that 
volatility transmission between the US and the Eurozone is bidirectional. The terrorist attack in 
New York in September 11 affected volatility in the Eurozone stock markets, but the terrorist 
attacks in Madrid and London in March 11 and July 7, respectively, did not affect volatility in 
the US market.  
Based on Johnston and Nedelescu (2006), there are several possible explanations for the 
differences in stock market reactions to the three terrorist attacks considered. Firstly, the 
September 11 terrorist attack had a direct impact on several financial markets, such as the 
aeronautical, tourism, banking, and insurance sectors. These sectors were not so badly affected in 
the case of the other terrorist attacks considered. Secondly, while the attacks in New York were 
perceived as a global shock, the attacks on Madrid and London were perceived as mostly having 
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a local and regional effect, respectively. Finally, while the events of September 11 occurred in 
the midst of a global economic downturn, the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London occurred at 
a time when the world economy was growing strongly. 
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